David Saunders appears to give most of the credit for the Decembrist revolt to the death of Alexander I, and the time of political confusion that arose from it. He references Baron Rosen’s belief that, “if the authorities had publicized Alexander’s plans for the succession as soon as they learnt of his death, everyone would have sworn the oath to Nicholas and the transition to the new reign would have been smooth” and “if he and about half a dozen others had been arrested, no rising would have taken place” (Saunders, 110). Yet, much of the chapter outlines the decades-long development of an underground resistance, stemming from centuries of unrest and a desire for a more representative government. There seems to be a contradiction in the fact that the resistance was overthrown relatively quickly and could have been easily kept from happening at all, yet had such a diverse and widespread collection of ideas and people, with a passion and desire for reform. Did their weakness lie in a lack of organization, communication, and representation of the lower classes? Was it their lack of preparation, up against the strength and foresight of Nicholas in quelling the revolt? Finally, if it hadn’t been for the political upset stemming from Alexander’s untimely death, would there have been a Decembrist revolt sometime in the future? Would an uprising have been more successful at a different time?
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I think the revolt’s failure was due largely to the fact that those in the Union didn’t seem to want a revolution at all. Despite writing a constitution, they recognized the Tsar’s near-absolute power (The Decembrist Movement, p. 221), and despite being inspired by the Enlightenment and French Revolution, they are very nationalist (p. 211: “The Union considers to be Russian citizens those who were born in Russia and who speak Russian… The Union considers worthy of this honor only foreigners who have rendered important services to our country and are passionately attached to it.”), as well as the fact that they have a “Rules of Conduct for the United Slavs”. Although they imitate Catherine’s style and agree with some of her views on crime, punishment and duty, they seem more conservative than Catherine. They are authoritarian within their own ranks, demanding tithes (pt. 12, “Every member… must contribute one twenty-fifth of his income to the common treasury”), secrecy (pt. 17, “No one may speak with outsiders about the work and affairs of the Union without specific permission”), reporting everything to them (pt. 16, “he must inform the union of everything that transpires in [government-approved societies] and should subtly direct them toward the aims of the Union”), and seeking to be the prime authority in the Russian government.
Furthermore, they still wanted disproportionate representation for the nobility (Saunders, 100: “[The Senate] of whom 200 were to be hereditary peers, 400 representatives of the nobility, and 400 of the people at large” – resembling the Three Estates of pre-revolutionary France) and excluded serfs from the category of citizens (Decembrists p. 210, pt. 2, “all Russian citizens – nobles, clergy, townsmen, merchants and free men”, which seems to reflect their priorities despite their claim of equality). Their policy of secrecy must have made it hard for them to recruit new members, and the separation between the northern and southern factions made things even more difficult. The fact that the revolt was led mainly by the military suggests that it was not a popular uprising. It wasn’t until decades later that the Decembrists were seen as revolutionaries.
I also found it interesting how the Union’s criteria for citizenship (p. 214) allowed for women, but they specifically prohibited women from joining them (p. 211, pt. 3) and from entering the Chamber during public sessions (p. 219, pt. 81), and kept the royal inheritance in the male line (p. 221, pt. 101a). This seems like a slap in the face to Catherine from those who claim to admire her (p. 208, pt. 4), but the fact that they would need to say it at all suggests that Russian women were starting to come out of their cloistered place in society.
I think, and I feel Saunders feels this way to some extent, that one of the main failures of the Decembrist movement was its elitism. Not only was membership predicated on a certain degree of specific education from the upper reaches of Russian intelligentsia, it was also largely a movement of officers. And while the Decembrist movement may have seemed relatively open compared to the earlier military coups (and possessed of a ‘higher’ purpose than petty factionalism) it still maintained a high degree of separation from the peasantry and common foot soldier. My favorite quote from this reading, and one that accurately represents the Decembrist separation from the masses, is “When instructed to shout for ‘Konstantin and a constitution’, the rebel troops on Senate Square were said to believe that ‘constitution’ was the name of Konstantin’s wife” (Saunders, 112). In fact, to an extremely conservative, devoutly Orthodox peasantry who had known no other traditions than autocracy, the Decembrist movement (outward-looking, Masonic-influenced, republican) was extremely threatening. The confusion over the essential connotations of narodnost’ (ie. Karamzin’s view that “Russian people-ness, or nationality, could not be defined without reference to [Orthodoxy and the state]” vs. Viezemskii’s conception of narodnost as “a social orientation whose pursuit would enable Russian intellectuals to distance themselves from the twin pillars of the Russian polity” (both Saunders 96)) represents the confusion over the aims of Decembrism, and who it would ultimately serve to benefit.
While Alexander I’s death served as the ultimate catalyst for the failed uprising, decades of scheming and tension laid fertile ground for action, making some form of revolution inevitable. Disagreement between the Northern and Southern Societies regarding centralization of power notwithstanding, there existed enough opponents of the tsarist regime to catalyze an attempt at revolt. The very reason for the Decembrists’ failure, for the expedient quelling of their revolt, lies in the “diverse and widespread” nature of its ideas and the schism of Decembrist ideology, further polarized by its distal hubs of planning and conspiracy. The Decembrist failure cannot be blamed on one shortcoming alone; rather, it was a convergence of factors that led to suppression, many of which are stated in the above question. Future attempts at dissent would prove more successful; the tsarist regime ended with Nicholas II, demonstrating not only possibility but success in revolution when carried out opportunely under a unified manifesto.