Russian Revolution(s) from Peter to Putin (HIST 316 Spr 17 Sec 2)

From Peter the Great’s technical schools to Catherine’s allusions to widespread education in the Nakaz, rulers in Russia have strived or at least leaned in the direction of reforming the nation’s social sphere through education. However, these efforts were not a particular priority for many years, and when Catherine’s seemingly modest changes in publishing and education became fuel for insurgence, one could draw the conclusion that mass educations and Russia’s ruling systems should not mix if order was to be maintained.

However, Stalin clearly believed otherwise. In the early years of the Five Year Plan, technical experts at the head of Soviet administration and industry were regarded with suspicion, and various policies were put in place to encourage the promotion of workers and Communists to higher positions, especially by making higher education in technical subjects available to them. “It was imperative to begin training a new generation of cadres who would be both Red and expert. The normal higher education system, especially the engineering schools, would provide the training. This meant curriculum changes and a new admissions policy that would discriminate strongly in favor of working-class and Communist applicants, even if their educational preparation was poor” (Fitzpatrick, 156). These social policies pushed certain demographics very intentionally into a new kind of Soviet elite, cadres who were both personally committed to the Soviet project and also prepared to head its growing industry and governmental leadership positions.

Fitzpatrick quotes Stalin’s reasoning for these social policies: “We need commanding and engineering-technical cadres capable of understanding the policies of the working class of our country, capable of mastering those policies and prepared to carry them out conscientiously… Our country has entered the phase of development when the working class must create its own productive-technical intelligentsia, capable of standing up for its own interests in production as the interests of the working class” (Fitzpatrick, 155, quotes fromStalin, “Novaia obstanovka-novye zadachi khoziaistvennogo stroitel’stva” (23 June 1931), in his Sochineniia”). Unlike Peter, Catherine, and other rulers wary of educating peasants and other working classes in fear of their uprising, Stalin is encouraging similar demographics to take control of the regime in accordance to his own agenda.

How did Stalin’s efforts to replace “bougeois” elements in the growing Soviet elite by reforming higher education and publicly pushing for workers to become technical experts build or break away from past relationships between rulers and education?

Russia’s recurring pursuit of expansion into warmer territory and attempting to rule over non-Russian ethnic groups in the Black Sea, Caucasus, and Central Asia became problematic in the 1880s as the nation sought a modern colonial empire similar to other European powers.

Bushkovitch describes complex and tense international relations on Russia’s borders, both western and southern: “In the course of the century the development of commercial and then industrial capitalism, however slow by European standards, changed the society of the empire. In the western borderlands the result was the declining economic fortunes of the nobility, the principal support of the empire… western areas benefited considerably from the imperial market and were willing to cooperate (within limits), but the aristocratic conservatism of the court and most of the ruling elite made an arrangement with newer social groups difficult or impossible. The Russian empire could not fully abandon its alliance with the local nobilities, nor could they survive without the tsars, and they all went down to destruction together in 1917” (Bushkovitch, 52). The strain of imperialist practices and increasingly capitalist international economy along Russia’s borders played a role in diminishing the traditional, autocratic foundation of the economy, already imperiled by the emancipation of the serfs.

Russia’s imperial structure relied on cooperation from well-off classes in the lands they took control over, but this system was vulnerable to fall apart in the face of certain aspects of Russian ‘modernization,’ notably education, which undermined the cooperation between foreign noble classes that formed the basis of the empire (Bushkovitch, 270).

This imperial situation, in which Russia expands to control southern territories of foreigners, engages in remote battles on unfamiliar terrain, and provides education to people who later use it against the empire oppressing them all sounds rather familiar. Russia’s engagement in the Caucasus and Central Asia are reminiscent of the way Catherine II’s empire grew to create a periphery that later became the home of the Pugachev Revolt, which Madriaga classified as being driven by Cossacks and Old Believers  living in occupied land as much or more than runaway peasants, all marginalized groups living at the edges of the empire beyond its direct control.

How do these kinds of power struggles along imperial borders drive social movements, such as peasant rebellions, anti-imperialist wars, and revolts? How might these expansions and shifts in power along the margins of the Russian Empire have contributed to the broader destabilization and unrest leading up to the revolution of 1917?

In reading Hadji Murat, I was struck by the diversity of people that were mentioned sitting around Vorontsov’s table at Tiflis. Georgian, Armenian, French, and Russian aristocracy wine and dine peacefully. While we have already noted the prevalence of French among the Petersburg nobility and what might be termed the ‘core’ of the Russian nobility, I was struck by the use of both French and Russian as lingua francas in this relatively peripheral environment. But it is not just ethnically French and ethnic Russians using French Manana Orbeliani, a Georgian noblewoman, interjects with “Tout cela est grace a de vous”(Tolstoy 43). I thought this might be an example of elite emulation, wherein the conquered group (Georgians) adopt the behaviors and practices of the conquerers. The interactions between French, Russian, and indigenous languages seems to be telling of the power dynamic between Russia and its Caucasian subjects. The meeting with Nicholas is inaugurated with a conversation in French, for example.There are also examples of linguistic exchange that occupy key moments in the text. When Hadji Murat is about to leave Ivan Matveevich’s house, he responds to a question in Russian, saying “Good-bye! Good-bye!…Kunak bulur. You strong kunak. Time – aida – go” (Tolstoy, 91). In this way, the friendliness of Hadji Murat is portrayed through the introduction of Russian to his speech. A sympathetic and grateful Marya Dmitrievna uses the Tatar “ulan yakshi” (92) when she accepts his burka. Tolstoy also sprinkles in numerous foreign Caucasian words, so much so that a glossary is needed at the back. This seems to be a way of foreignizing the text and speech of Murat, marking it as other. There does seem to be a value judgement attached to the speaking of Avar or Tatar.

It is worth noting that this kind of linguistic hierarchy was not just confined to the Caucasus. Ukraine and the Ukrainian language are accorded lower status, with Bushkovitch saying that “Disagreements among the various layers of Russian bureaucracy over the language issue meant that some Ukrainian language books did appear, and local history and traditions were cultivated in the Russian language.” (Bushkovitch 262) and that “In the Ukrainian cities small groups of intellectuals with a Ukrainian cultural orientation emerged, but they had little impact as yet. The cities remained firmly Russian speaking up to 1917 and after” (Bushkovitch 262) indicating that through both official government pressure and general cultural conformity, the Ukrainian language was marked as lower and unsuitable for public discourse. Similarly, the development of economic and political reform in the Finnish province was accompanied by a mandate “that petitions and other documents to the administration could be presented in Finnish as well as Swedish (Russian was not contemplated). The Finnish peasant deputies, all firm supporters of the Finnish language, were the tsar’s main allies in Finland, against the mostly Swedish-speaking liberals among the urban noble deputies.” (Bushkovitch 257). Increased political agency is accompanied by a promotion of indigenous, and decreased political agency (ie. Ukraine) is accompanied by the shunning of non-Russian, indigenous languages.

I’m interested in the Bushkovich reading and Hadji Murat in the context of Russia’s continuous attempts at Westernization. Bushkovich describes Russia’s territorial annexation as a mimicking of the successes of European colonial empires. Russia has been consistently referred to as a “backwards” country, which seems to have created a unique dynamic between the Russians and the Caucasians. There is a tension between Russia’s imperialist inclinations – embedding Russian culture and infrastructure, and integrating territories into the Russian economy – and the realities of its ability to control so many diverse peoples. Russia seems still to be a “developing” nation, and this impacts the type of relationship it has to its colonized groups.

What can Hadji Murat tell us about the nature of Russia’s colonial expeditions? To me, Hadji Murat seems to be symbolic of this complex relationship, and his story puts into question Russia’s stance as a European power. Hadji Murat’s identity is torn between his allegiance to his own people and the acceptance he has found amongst the Russians. Bushkovich describes Russia as “…too modern to remain an empire of nobilities around the tsar, but too backwards to fully unleash the social forces that integrated minorities in Western Europe” (Bushkovich, 270). Perhaps Hadji Murat inhabits a similar position. If we agree with this analogy, what can we say about Hadji Murat’s eventual death?

Madariaga touches upon, in her description of the events surrounding the executions of Pugachev and four of his principal followers, Catherine’s secret intercession on behalf of the sentenced. By commanding the executioner to begin the quartering process with beheading, she aimed to minimize the agitators’ physical suffering, while maintaining a public façade of expedient and severe punishment. Moreover, this discovery of her interference was not determined until the twentieth century, speaking to the degree of its concealment. This requirement of Catherine to call for this grim concession, an act of fundamental humanity, “in a completely clandestine fashion,” suggests Madariaga, reflects curiously “on the nature of absolute power” (Madariaga, 63). Did this secrecy aid in consolidating an image of her as a stern leader, in efforts to dissuade dissenters from future instigation? In light of the manifesto issued March 17, 1775, granting mass amnesty to those at all attached to the revolt and reducing sentences, what do these two orders, both private and public, reveal of Catherine’s disposition as ruler? What was suggested to the public through the initial executions, then leniency? Furthermore, why was Catherine so eager to suppress memory of the Pugachevshchina and celebrate Russia’s defeat of the Ottoman Empire; what purposes did a bolstering of national morale serve her regime?

Meanwhile, Pugachev and his administration’s tactics suffered from disorganization, discordant ambitions, and illiteracy. The most coherent of their goals, “the ultimate political aim of Pugachev and his immediate followers…was the repudiation of the Russian state as founded by Peter the Great” (61). However, despite this aversion to Peter’s reforms, he still enlisted the former tsar’s terminology in his College of War. In its employment of many methods used by the standing tsarist regime, Pugachev’s administration “recreated for its own purposes the administrative structures it had overthrown” (62.) Further de-legitimization occurred in his marriage to the daughter of a Cossack. In what ways did this pretender’s ascension require from the public ignorance or a suspension of disbelief? How did Catherine’s constituency differ from those beneath Pugachev? Where subtlety and precision served Catherine’s role as leader, a fraught environment and a stubborn imagination promoted Pugachev as he managed to manipulate an atmosphere of unrest.

If there’s one thing Russia has no shortage of, it’s land. Thus, it should be easy to see why land ownership was seen as essential to freedom and prosperity. “Until Catherine’s reign, the moral right to own serfs had never been questioned in Russia. The distribution of peasants attached to land had initially been considered not as a reward for service [of nobles], but as a means of making service possible (Madariaga, 54). This indicates that no tsar thought of paying nobles decently for their service to the state, forcing them to be independently wealthy (a problem we still see in America today). Was it something about Catherine’s policies that made nobles feel they had to start fighting serfdom, and made other nobles feel they had to start defending it?

Also, it seems that land was starting to lose its essentiality during Catherine’s reign. “The theme proposed by Catherine was: What is most useful for society – that the peasant should own the land or only movable property, and how far should his rights over the one or the other extend?” (55) Does this indicate that Catherine was starting to see the value of pushing peasants into non-agricultural occupations, or is she simply being practical in appeasing the landowners and still expecting the peasants to work another’s land?

According to Madariaga, during the 1760’s Catherine the Great grappled with the idea of changing conditions of serfdom with Russia. This came to a halt when Russia entered war with the Ottoman Empire in 1768. Because of this war Catherine raised taxes and started conscripting peasants to military service at a high rate. This conscription was extremely straining not only due to the high amount of men being taken from peasant villages but also because there had not been a conscription during the years of 1762-7. However, the major revolt in 1773-4 is more attributable to the Yaik Cossacks, the majority of whom were “Old Believers”. “Old Believers” are those who opposed the church reforms introduced the Patriarch Nikon during the 1650s (Goshkov, pg. 32). The plan for the entirety of the Cossack Hosts was for their regiment to be reformed under the name of the “Moscow Legion” for the war against Turkey. “This seemed to threaten the Cossacks with ‘becoming regulars’, which they regard as contrary to their traditional form of service. Morover they feared that, as regular soldiers, they would be forced to shave their beards which, since a large number of the Yaik Cossacks were Old Believers, would offend against their religious beliefs.” (Madariaga, pg. 57). The common Cossacks were also currently angry over the allocation of fishing licences. While the Yaik Cossack had a fear that was very religious, they were able to convince the larger group of Cossacks that their angers of secular reasons were worth arguing over. Pugachev, the main leader of the the Cossack revolt, was a “pretender”, or someone who was pretending to be a tsar that had been wronged by the boyars. By saying that he was Peter III, Pugachev was able to unite the Cossacks under the idea that they had all been wronged by Catherine. Pugachev ultimately wanted to take over Russia and restore the state rule to reflect the way it had looked when Peter the Great had taken over. “There were to be no regular armed forces, no conscription, no taxation, the land was to belong to those who worked it, there were to be no nobles, no government officials, no foreign officers or uniforms, no European clothes, no shaven chins” (Madariaga, pg. 61). This want to exemplify Peter the Great, the man who had made the first major push to make Russia into a European country seems extremely nostalgic. Mostly with this post I am curious to explore more of the way in which nostalgia coupled with anger was used as a driving force for change within the peasant revolts of the 1770’s in contrast with revolts we have studied so far like the Decemberist revolt which took advantage of times in which the status of authority of the state has been questionable or in flux.

Madariaga’s account of Catherine’s reign indicates a tension between Catherine’s admiration of Western culture and her desire to maintain power. The Westernization of Russia under her rule seemed to take effect significantly more in the higher-ranking classes than among the peasants. As a consequence of this, the revolutionary mentalities drawn from the French seem, to me, fairly abstracted from reality. While Radischev did actively push for political reform, it seems as though Catherine herself was much more interested in the intellectualism of the revolutionary movement, as opposed to the social consequences that stem from it. While Radischev’s comments were unacceptable due to their critical nature, Catherine’s general ideologies seem to align with his, as she also pondered the liberation of the serfs. However, her beliefs seem to be based less of of empathy and concern but rather a fascination with the modernity of Western thought. Catherine seemed to invest most of her hope in the noble class. This is evident in her criticism of the French nobles after the French Revolution: “She blamed the weakness of the French nobles on the expulsion of the Jesuits and the decline in the quality of French education as a result of the closure of their schools” (Madariaga p. 191). Catherine seems to view social upheaval not as a result of oppressive policies, but rather of misinformation, and lack of education. Ultimately, her obsession with intellectualism blinded her from the social realities of Russia.

According to Riha, “The Soviets view[ed] [Radischev] as the first Russian revolutionary” (261). This seems to conflict with the idea that the Decembrists were the first Russian revolutionaries, as they came decades later. Furthermore, Radischev seems overall a more admirable figure than the Decembrists, and we know that the Soviets were prone to building cults of personality around an individual, even though this seemingly conflicts with Communism. But can Radischev be seen as a revolutionary at all, since he seemed to be an army of one and did not advocate overthrow of the monarchy? And was Catherine responsible for his radicalization, as it was her government that sent him to the West?

As we learned before and throughout today’s readings, Peter the Great was keen on revolutionizing Russia by transplanting Western European styles, ideas, and customs to Russian society, most notably to the nobility and urban dwellers. The Honorable Mirror for Youth is a prime example of this transplantation, notably when it comes to encouraging foreign languages in lesson 27: “Young men should always speak between themselves in foreign languages, so that they will thereby get accustomed to it. Especially when they have something secret to speak about, so the servants and servant girls cannot hear, and so that you can distinguish them from other ignorant blockheads” (Kollman, 67). According to this lesson, it is vital to a properly educated young nobleman to enforce his class standing by limiting communication between himself and commoners by creating new linguistic barriers within Russian society.

This passage of Honorable Mirror encourages noble youth to reinforce a cultural and linguistic divide that casts the Russian language down as something only “blockheads” and gossiping servants speak. What were other effects of interpreting the Russian language, dress, and other traditional customs as unworthy of the nobility? How might this cultural and linguistic divide affect how Russians from different classes defined nationality during Peter’s reign and beyond?

How did the introduction of European languages into Russia change literature and other aspects of educated, upper-class culture? How did Russians who were taught disdain for their country’s native language diverge from Russians who were never taught any of Peter’s foreign tongues?